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SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN THE NEWSROOM-
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FIRST
AND FOURTH AMENDMENTS-
ZURCHER V. THE STANFORD DAILY
On April 9, 1971, nine police officers were injured while attempting to
remove a large group of demonstrators from the administrative offices of the
Stanford University Hospital.' The officers were only able to identify two of
their assailants. 2 Subsequently, however, photographs appearing in a spe-
cial edition of the University's student newspaper, The Stanford Daily, indi-
cated that a student photographer could have photographed the assault on
the officers. 3 The following day, a search warrant was secured by the local
District Attorney's Office for the purpose of obtaining negatives, film, "or
any pictures which display the events and occurrences" at the University
hospital on the evening of the demonstration. 4 An extensive search of the
Stanford Daily's offices was conducted later that afternoon.
5
In response to the search, the Stanford Daily and seven of its staff mem-
bers filed suit on May 13, 1971 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California, alleging that under color of state law they had been
deprived of rights guaranteed by the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution.' The district court granted them
declaratory relief on a motion for summary judgment, and they subsequently
1. Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily, 98 S. Ct. 1970, 1974 (1978). According to police af-
fidavits, the attackers were armed with sticks and chair legs. One policeman was "struck re-
peatedly on the head; another suffered a broken shoulder. All nine were injured." Extensive
damage to the offices resulted from both "the occupation and removal of the demonstrators." Id.
at n.1.
2. Id.
3. id.
4. Brief' for Petitioners Zurcher, Bonader, Desinger, Martin and Peardon at 21-22 [here-
inafter cited as Brief for Petitioner Zurcher]. There was no question as to the defendant magis-
trate's finding of probable cause, at least insofar as that term had been defined until this case.
See note 56 infra'. For a conventional analysis of the term, see Carrol v. United States. 267 U.S.
132, 161-62 (1925).
5. The facts of the search were somewhat in dispute. Compare Brief'for Petitioner Zurcher
at 10 and Brief' for Petitioners Bergna and Brown at 9-10 [hereinafter cited as Brief' for
Petitioner Bergnal with Brief for Respondents at 2-3. All parties agreed, however, that the
search included an examination of file cabinets, waste baskets, desks and drawers, and that the
officers were in a position to have read confidential material. Whether they in fact did so was
disputed. Ironically, the search proved to be futile, since the only photographs found by the
police were those which had been previously published. Id.
6. The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), with jurisdiction conferred by 28
U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). Named as defendants in the original complaint were the judge who had
issued the warrant, the district attorney, a deputy district attorney who had helped secure the
warrant, the officers who conducted the search, and their chief' of police. 98 S. Ct. at 1975 n.4.
Upon a motion by the plaintiffs, the action against the judge was dismissed. Id.
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received an award of $43,000 7 in attorney's fees. The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit adopted the district court's opinion and af-
firmed per curiam. a Upon appeal, however, the United States Supreme
Court in a 5-3 decision, reversed.
The issue facing the Court in Zurcher v. The Stanford Daily 9 was
whether the Fourth Amendment, 10 either by itself or in concert with the
First Amendment,1 1 prohibits searches of newsrooms pursuant to a warrant
where no member of the newspaper staff is suspected of involvement in the
crime giving rise to the search. The Court held that neither amendment
forbade law enforcement officials from obtaining warrants to search the pos-
sessions of any non-suspect, i.e., third party, so long as there existed proba-
ble cause to believe that fruits, instrumentalities, or other evidence of a
crime would be found at a specified location.1 2
The Court found no authority for the district court's holding that 1)
searches of all third parties were forbidden unless state law enforcement
officials could establish the impracticality of issuing subpoenas; and 2) when
the third party was a newsroom staff, the standard rose to "a clear showing
that important materials will be destroyed or removed from the jurisdic-
tion."13 According to the Court, such standards were categorically unsup-
7. The Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Because the Su-
preme Court reversed on the substantive claim, it did not reach the issues of the amount or
propriety of the attorney's fees award. 98 S. Ct. at 1975 n.3. These issues had been extensively
briefed by both petitioners and respondents. See Brief for Petitioner Bergna at 26-35; Brief fbr
Petitioner Zurcher at 35-45; Brief for Respondents at 54-68. Respondents also sought a perma-
nent injunction against future searches but were denied relief. The district court reasoned that such
relief was unnecessary because it was expected that the petitioner law enforcement officers
would honor the declaratory decision. 353 F. Supp. at 136.
8. 550 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1977).
9. 98 S. Ct. 1970 (1978). Justice White delivered the majority opinion, in which Justices
Rehnquist, Blackmun and Powell joined. Justice Powell also filed a concurring opinion. Justice
Stewart was joined by Justice Marshall in his dissent, while Justice Stevens filed a separate
dissent. Justice Brennan did not participate in the consideration or decision of the case.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. IV provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press ....
12. 98 S. Ct. at 1976. In so holding, the Court was applying the traditional judicial interpre-
tation of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements to third party searches. See, e.g.,
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-35 (1967). Note the federal law in this area.
FED. R. Cir. P. 12. See also United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 105 n.1 (1965). At least
one commentator has indicated that the traditional rule does in fact apply to third parties. See
T. TAYLOR, Two STUDIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION [hereinafter cited as
TAYLOR]. Most, however, have noted the rule without mentioning the issue of the searched
party's culpability. See, e.g. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 349, 358 (1974).
13. 98 S. Ct. at 1976-78, quoting The Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353 F. Supp. 124 at 127,
135. In setting out this standard the district court quoted at length from two state court deci-
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ported by prior case law. 14  In addition, they would impose an undue bur-
den upon law enforcement efforts without a concomitant protection of any
significant First or Fourth Amendment interests. 15
This decision is particularly significant in light of the virtually unanimous
claim by the media that the Supreme Court's holding would severely inhibit
the functioning of the press.' 6 The case is also important because it reflects
a continuation of the Court's recent trend limiting Fourth Amendment pro-
tection of private papers. 17
The purpose of this Note is to critically evaluate the Court's opinion and
assess its impact upon privacy rights and press freedoms. The Note will
commence by briefly describing the background of the Fourth Amendment.
It will then analyze the Court's use of precedent and policy considerations in
sions: Owens v. Way, 141 Ga. 796, 82 S.E. 132 (1914) and Commodity Mtg. Co. v. Moore, 198
N.Y.S. 45 (Sup. Ct. 1923), 353 F. Supp. at 128.
The Commodity court, in what was clearly dictum, did address the issue directly, stating that
the seizure of evidence from an innocent party, even with a search warrant, "would open the
door to grave abuses of invasion of property rights." 198 N.Y.S. at 47. Some commentators have
expressed the view that this statement rested on the now-discredited "mere evidence rule." See
Note, Searches and Seizures-Warranted Search of Party Not Suspected of Criminal Behavior
Is Unreasonable When Subpoena Not Shown to Be Impractical, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1317, 1319
n.15 (1973) [hereinafter referred to as Harvard Note]. The Commodity court, however, never
referred to, nor implied, any reliance upon the rule.
The Zurcher district court also relied heavily on Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th
Cir. 1971), and analogized from Bacon's holding that a material witness may not be arrested
without a demonstration of probable cause that it is impracticable to secure his presence at a
grand jury hearing by subpoena. For an analysis of the district court's reliance on Bacon, see
Harvard Note supra, at 1319-22.
The majority opinion in Zurcher justificably dismissed the significance of these cases in a
footnote. 98 S. Ct. at 1975-76 n.5. It should be noted, however, that the Supreme Court could
not find a single case concerned with the issue of third party searches that supported their
holding. Those cases that relate to third party searches have, in the past, been concerned
exclusively with the question of a defendant's standing to raise constitutional objections to the
introduction of the fruits of such searches. See, e.g., Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223
(1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-76 (1969); Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 492 (1963). See generally White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and
Seizure, 118 U.PA. L. REV. 333 (1970); Comment, Jus Tertii-Standing to Invoke Violation of
Constitutional Rights of a Third Party, 38 TENN. L. REV. 538 (1971).
14. 98 S. Ct. at 1975-80.
15. 98 S. Ct. at 1979-80.
16. The Court's decision was roundly condemned in numerous newspapers. See, e.g., N.Y.
Times, June 1, 1978, col. 1 at 47; Chicago Tribune, June 1, 1978, col. 1 at 50; Washington Post,
June 1, 1978, col. 1 at 42.
17. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) (Fourth Amendment does not forbid the
seizure of one's business records, nor does the Fifth Amendment prohibit their introduction at
trial); Warden v. Hayden, 387 US. 294 (1967) (the distinction prohibiting seizure of items of
only evidential value and allowing seizure of instrumentalities, fruits, or contraband is no longer
accepted as being required by the Fourth Amendment). See generally Note, Private Papers
Now Subject to Reasonable Search And Seizure, 26 DEPAUL L. RE'. 848 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as DePaul Note]; Comment, The Search and Seizure of Private Papers, Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Considerations, 6 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 274 (1963).
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deciding that neither third parties in general nor third party newsrooms in
particular should be accorded any greater constitutional protections against
searches and seizures than are given to persons suspected of criminal in-
volvement. Finally, it will suggest an alternative holding and offer some ob-
servations concerning the possible ramifications of the decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE DECISION
Third Party Searches in General:
Fourth Amendment Considerations
In drafting the Fourth Amendment, the Framers were influenced in large
part by the memory of the pernicious and invidious intrusions which had
been suffered by English and colonial citizens from their government's use
of general warrants and writs of assistance.' These warrants and writs al-
lowed officers discretion to search among the most private possessions of a
citizen.1 9 The Fourth Amendment was designed not only to prevent a revi-
val of such measures, but to guarantee to all individuals the sanctity of their
homes and the privacy of their lives. 20
While obviously aware of these historical facts, the Court believed that a
third party's Fourth Amendment interests would be adequately protected by
the general rule governing search warrants. This rule requires prosecutors to
establish probable cause that evidence of a crime is located at a specified
place. 2 ' The Court's holding was predicated upon its belief that prior case
law had demonstrated the applicability of this rule to all parties, including
those not suspected of criminal involvement. 22 To this end, the Court ex-
pressly relied upon three prior decisions. 23
18. Such writs were generally obtained by revenue officers in order to search for smuggled
goods, while the warrants were used for the seizure of books and papers in an attempt to
substantiate a charge of seditious libel. 2 T. PATERSON, LIBERTY OF THE SUBJECT (1877); see
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
19. William Pitt wrote in opposition to general warrants:
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the Crown. It
may be frail - its roof may shake - the wind may blow through it - the storm may
enter, the rain may enter - but the King of England cannot enter - all his force
(fares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.
T. HIANSARD, 15 PARLIMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND (17S3-1765) 1307 (1816). James Otis
denounced the writs of assistance as "the worst instrument of arbitrary power, the most destruc-
tive of English liberty, and the finmdumental principles of law, that ever was found in an English
law book" because they placed "the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer."
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 625 (1886).
20. 1d.
21. See note 12 s mpra.
22. 98 S. Ct. at 1975-77.
23. It is important to note at the outset that the Court's treatment of Fourth Amendment
precedent is permeated by an inconsistent, and generally incorrect interpretation of the district
court's holding. The district court held that unless a subpoena is impractical, warrants may not
issue to search the possessions of one "not suspected of a crime." 353 F. Supp. at 127. On one
[Vol. 28:123
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The first, Carrol v. United States,24 discussed the difference between the
preconditions for search and seizure and those for arrest. Carrol held that
the validity of a warrantless search of an automobile for illicit liquor and the
subsequent seizure of such liquor was not dependent upon the right to ar-
rest the occupants of the automobile.2 5  From this the majority in Zurcher
concluded that the "critical" element of a reasonable search was whether
probable cause existed for believing that the evidence to be seized was lo-
cated at the place to be searched, and not that the owner or possessor of this
evidence was criminally suspect.2 6
The problem with this conclusion, however, is two-fold. First, the holding
of Carrol is clearly restricted to the narrow issue of automobile searches for
contraband, and hence is inapposite as precedent for any general Fourth
Amendment principles. 27  More importantly, the majority plainly misreads
this holding. For although Carrol establishes that probable cause to arrest is
not a prerequisite for conducting an automobile search, it does not suggest
that suspicion of illegal activity is likewise unnecessary. On the contrary, by
requiring a seizing officer to possess "reasonable cause" to believe that "the
contents of the automobile ojjfend against the law, -28 the Court in Carrol
indicates that suspicion of' criminal conduct is an essential predicate. 29 Thus,
occasion the Court explicitly misstates this, asserting that the holding conditions the state's
entitlement to a search warrant" on its "right to arrest" the possessor of' property. 98 S. Ct. at
1976. The Court implicitly relies on its mistaken interpretation several other times. See 98 S.
Ct. at 1976-79, particularly n.6. Occasionally, the Court correctly states the holding. ("The
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the issuance of a warrant to search for materials in
possession of one not suspected of a crime. ... ) 98 S. Ct. at 1975 (emphasis supplied).
This misinterpretation clearly undermines the validity of the majority's analysis, for by claim-
ing that the district court's rule requires the state to show probable cause to arrest rather than
suspicion of criminal activity, they present an argument which is easier for them to rebut. After
all, since probable Cause to arrest is a more stringent standard than suspicion, it is ipso facto
more difficult to support, and hence, more easily defeated.
Because this Note finds that the cases cited by the Court during this section of its opinion are
both factually distinguishable from the instant case and objectionable on other grounds, see
notes 24-44 and accompanying text infra, it assumes arguendo that the Court did not commit
this interpretative error.
24. 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless seizure of contraband liquor transported by automobile
held not to be in violation of Fourth Amendment). See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S.
694, 700-01 (1931).
25. 267 U.S. 132 at 158-59.
26. 98 S. Ct. at 1977.
27. See, e.g., the Court's discussion of Carrol in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-52
(1970). In referring to the very quotation which the Zurcher Court cites with approval, see 98 S.
Ct. at 1977, the Chambers Court points out that "[t]he Carrol Court also noted that the search
of an auto . . . proceeds on a theory wholly different from that justifying the search incident to
arrest." 399 U.S. at 49 (emphasis supplied).
28. 267 U.S. 132 at 158-59 (emphasis added).
29. Objects which 'offend against the law"(i.e. contraband) carry an unavoidable presump-
tion of criminality, hence the possessor of such objects would have to be suspected of illegal
activity. For a definition of contraband, see BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 393 (4th ed. 1951). See
also State v. Butler, 148 S.C. 495, 146 S.E. 418, 419 (1890).
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instead of supporting the majority's opinion, the Carrol decision might con-
ceivably be used to rebut the Zurcher position, were it not for the fact that
the Carrol holding is so limited.
The second case cited by the Court, United States v. Manufacturers Na-
tional Bank of Detroit,3" post-dated the Zurcher district court's decision and
expressly rejected its holding. 31 The precedential value of this case, how-
ever, is particularly weak. In Manufacturers, the wife and daughter of a
defendant claimed to be third parties and stied to recover monies and
equipment which had been seized from a safety deposit box jointly owned
by them. 32  The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs reliance
upon Zurcher by merely asserting that warrants may issue once a magistrate
has probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and that
evidence of the crime will be found in a specified location. 33 Since no prior
decisions were cited and no argument was proffered in support of this asser-
tion, Manufatcturers appears to be devoid of any significant analytical
value. 3
4
In Camara v. Municipal Court,3 5 the third case relied on by the majority,
the Court held for the first time that administrative searches (i.e., searches
for violations of health codes, housing codes, or other civil statutes) came
within the pale of the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.3 6  This
reversed an earlier decision, Frank v. Maryland,37 which had allowed such
searches to be conducted without a warrant. Frank was predicated upon the
notion that the main purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to protect indi-
viduals against official intrusions designed to secure evidence against them
for criminal prosecutions. 3 8  Despite the conflict between these cases, the
An additional objection may be leveled against the majority's utilization of Carrol. By citing
that case, the Court was implicitly relying on its misinterpretation of the Zurcher district court's
holding. See note 23 supra. For even if one accepts the Court's reading of Carrol, it would
compel only the conclusion that probable cause to arrest is not a prerequsite for conducting a
search, and not that searches may be carried out in the absence of any showing of suspicion.
30. 536 F.2d 699 (6th Cir. 1976).
31. Id. at 703.
32. Id. at 700-01.
33. id. at 703.
34. The majority also cited State v. Tunnel Citgo Servs., 149 N.J. Super. 427, 374 A.2d 32
(1977). However, the State court merely quoted the "reasoning" of the Manufacturers court. Id.
at 433, 374 A.2d at 35.
35. 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (warrantless inspection of private premises for violation of San Fran-
cisco Housing Code held unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment). See also Camara's
companion case, See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (warrantless inspection of private
commercial premises pursuant to Seattle Fire Code held constitutionally impermissible under
Fourth Amendment).
36. 387 U.S. 523 at 527-28.
37. 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (Baltimore City Code permitting warrantless inspections for health
hazards held not to violate Fourth Amendment). See also Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (1960),
which upheld the Frank decision.
38. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 365-66 (1959). But see Justice Douglas's dissent: "The
Court misreads history when it relates the Fourth Amendment to searches for evidence to be
used in criminal prosecutions." Id. at 376 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Zurcher Court believed that both Frank and Camara added support to its
holding, since far from suggesting that the owner of property must be sus-
pected of criminal involvement in order to be searched, they each
sanctioned searches where criminal evidence was not even being sought.39
A more exacting analysis of Frank and Camara, however, manifests the
sophistic nature of the Court's reasoning. The only similarity between the
searches conducted in Frank, Camara, and Zurcher is that none of them
involved attempts to recover criminal evidence to be used against its posses-
sor. Although this factual congruity is not insignificant, it is surely insuffi-
cient to compel the conclusion that administrative searches are constitution-
ally indistinguishable from searches of third parties for criminal evidence. 40
This insufficiency is dramatically illustrated by the majority's wholesale fail-
ure to examine the factors which had led the Court in Camara to require
that officials first procure warrants before engaging in administrative
searches. Such factors included the efficacy of alternative procedures and the
degree of the intrusion accompanying such searches. 4 1 Even the most per-
functory application of these factors to Zurcher would indicate legitimate
reasons for distinguishing between administrative and third party searches.
First, no alternative means exist enabling state officials to discover health
and housing code violations without entering the premises where such in-
fractions are allegedly being committed. 42 Unlike administrative searches,
however, in searching third parties, certain viable options do exist. By far
the easiest is an informal request; a more pragmatic method may be the
subpoena duces tecmn. 43  Second, searches for criminal evidence, by their
very nature, entail a much greater potential privacy intrusion than inspec-
tions of residences designed to discover faulty plumbing, structural defects,
or rodent infestations. 44
39. 98 S. Ct. at 1976-78. As Justice White wrote: "[I1 those considered free of criminal
involvement may nevertheless be searched or inspected under civil statutes, it is difficult to
understand why the Fourth Amendment would prevent entry onto their property to recover
evidence of a crime not committed by them but by others." 98 S. Ct. at 1978.
40. This, in essence, was the Court's conclusion. See id.
41. See 387 U.S. 523 at 530-39.
42. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967): "There is unanimous agreement
among those most familiar with this field that the only eflective way to seek universal com-
pliance with the minimum standards required by municipal codes is through routine periodic
inspections . . ." Id. at 535. See also Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372 (1959).
43. See note 109 infra. A subpoena duces tecum is one which commands a witness to bring
to court (or a grand jury hearing) some document or paper which he has in his possession, and
which is relevant to the controversy at issue. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1595 (4th ed. 1951).
44. Ironically, the Court in Camara (per Justice White, who also wrote the decision in the
instant case) suggested this distinction: "A routine inspection of the physical condition of private
property is a less hostile intrusion than the typical policeman's search for fruits and instrumen-
talities of a crime" 387 U.S. 523, 530.
A more subtle irony evidenced by this quote is found in the Court's use of "fruits and in-
strumentalities," a phrase typical of the "mere evidence" period, see note 56 infra, when the
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Not only, therefore, is the "invasion" more severe in searches of third
parties, but the "need" for such an intrusion is often less demonstrable.
When one considers that the Camara Court itself explicitly recognized the
differences between searches for civil infractions and those for criminal evi-
dence, 45 the majority's reliance upon Frank and Camara is all but casuistic.
Policy Considerations
The Zurcher Court's decision was grounded upon more than an interpre-
tation of prior case law. The majority also devoted a section of their opinion
to policy considerations, asking whether the district court's subpoena re-
quirement would "substantially ftrther privacy interests without seriously
undermining law enforcement efforts." 46 The propriety of conducting such
an inquiry cannot be doubted, for there is ample precedent establishing
that, under the Fourth Amendment, "there is no ready test for determining
reasonableness" other than by "balancing the need to search against the in-
vasion which the search entails." 4 7  Furthermore, the constitutionality of
third party searches is virtually an issue of first impression. 48 There are sim-
ply no relevant cases to turn to for guidance, the majority's mistaken view to
the contrary notwithstanding.
The Court commenced its balancing analysis by articulating two reasons
why the government's fundamental interest in law enforcement would be
adversely affected by the district court's "subpoena-first" rule. 49 First,
search warrants are generally employed at the beginning of criminal investi-
gations when the identity of the perpetrator is unknown, and the ostensibly
inculpable "third party" may in fact be involved in the crime. Even if he is
not, his relationship with the actual perpetrator may be such that, were he
subpoenaed, he would so inform the perpetrator or destroy the evidence
search carried out against The Stanford Daily would probably have been forbidden on eviden-
tiary grounds alone. Id. Actually, the mere evidence rule had been abandoned when the Cain-
ara decision was handed down, see Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1957), but it was only
one week earlier. It is therefore more than likely that the two decisions were written concur-
rently. For a criticism of the Court's reliance on pre-Warden case law, see note 56 infra and
Justice Steven's dissenting opinion in the instant case, 98 S. Ct. at 1976.
The Court's inconsistent interpretation of the Zurcher district court's holding, see note 23
supra, is no more apparent than in its analysis of Frank and Camara. The majority commences
their discussion by misstating the holding and ends it by stating it correctly. See 98 S. Ct. at
1976.
45. See note 44 supra.
46. 98 S. Ct. at 1979.
47. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). See also Go-Bart Co. v. Un-
ited States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931): "There is no formula for the determination of [Fourth
Amendment] reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own f acts and circumstances."
282 U.S. at 357.
48. The only cases even remotely concerned with this issue were the older state court deci-
sions upon which the district court mistakenly relied. See note 13 supra. Of course neither case
concerned the search of a newsroom.
49. 98 S. Ct. at 1979.
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himself. 50  Second, the Court suggested that the party summoned by sub-
poena may assert his privilege against self-incrimination. 5 ' Since pros-
ecutors would rarely be able to sustain the burden of overcoming such an
assertion, particularly in the early stages of an investigation, the opportunity
to obtain valuable evidence may be foreclosed. Even if they could sustain
the burden, the time spent in litigation alone would substantially impede
their progress. These reasons persuaded the majority that even as against
third parties, subpoenas could not be effectively employed as a substitute
procedure for search warrants. 52
The Court then very briefly discussed the possibility that the district
court's rule would act to protect a third party's interest in privacy.
53 It
concluded that because search warrants are more difficult to obtain than
subpoenas, it is unlikely that a clear-thinking prosecutor will choose the
former without substantial grounds to believe the warrant is "necessary to
secure and to avoid the destruction of evidence."
' 54
The problem with the Court's analysis, however, is that the overwhelming
majority of search warrants are used in an attempt to procure fruits, in-
strumentalities of a crime or contraband, 55 the very kind of evidence which
would give rise to the inference that the party in possession is sufficiently
50. Id.
51. Id. at n.8.
52. Id. In response to this argument it should be noted that it seems somewhat anomolous
to hold a search and seizure constitutionally permissible tinder the Fourth Amendment because
it may otherwise lead to a valid invocation of one's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Although the Court has held that a subpoena may violate the Fifth Amendment
in circumstances where, had a search and seizure occurred, it would not have infringed upon
Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights, see, e.g., Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), this
holding is surely different from the argument above. For a criticism of Andresen, see Justice
Brennan's dissent in that case. Id. at 486 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also DePaul Note, supra
note 17, at 848. In the context of its Fifth Amendment argument, the Court also urged that the
state's interest in the enforcement of criminal laws and the recovery of evidence remains exactly
the same, whether or not such evidence is in the possession of a criminal or a third party.
While that is true, it begs the question of whether this interest collides with a third party's
countervailing interest in privacy. See notes 92-95 and accompanying text infra. See also Justice
Steven's dissenting remarks on this subject, 98 S. Ct. at 1989-90.
53. 98 S. Ct. at 1980.
54. Id.
55. See L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE, JR., D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME 99-104
(1967) [hereinafter cited as DETECTION OF CRIME]. In fact, the vast majority of searches are
those incident to arrest. Id. at 105. Despite the Court's expressed preference for search war-
rants, they are "rarely used" by police, and then generally only to aid in prosecutions against
vice. Id. at 100-01. For an argument that this preference for search warrants is, historically,
misplaced, see TAYLOR note 12, supra at 44-46. Mr. Taylor suggests that the Framers (and the
Court, at least until the 1920's) were afraid of the abuses associated with searches by warrant,
see notes 17-18 supra; and not with warrantless searches. According to Mr. Taylor, until this
century, the Court had never heard a case involving warrantless searches. ...
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culpable to be denied third party status. 56 In fact, both petitioners 57 and
dissenting Justice Stevens 5 agreed that the mere possession of fruits,
instrumentalities or contraband would alone satisfy the district court's "im-
practicality" standard. 59 Since, therefore, only evidence in the form of docu-
ments, photographs and the like could even raise the possibility that a sub-
56. Dissenting Justice Stevens argues that the unique question presented by the Zurcher
controversy is attributable to the Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), decision wherein the
Court abandoned an evidentiary distinction that pre-dated even the Constitution. 98 S. Ct. at
1987.
In the famous English decision of Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765), Lord
Camden outlawed not only the general warrant but also searches for a suspect's private papers
to aid in his conviction. The "mere evidence" rule apparently grew out of this decision. See
generally T. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 431-32 (7th ed. 1903); N. LASSON, THE HIs-
TORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITU-
TION (1911); R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1955). Until Warden there was
a "distinction between evidentiary materials . .. which may not be seized . . .[and] those objects
which may validly be seized including ... instrumentalities ... fruits . . . and property,
the possession of which is a crime [i.e. contraband]." Harris v. United States, 331 U.S.
145, 154 (1947). Papers could be seized if they fit into one of tile numerated categories-f'or
example, stolen or forged checks. Langdon v. People, 133 111. 382 (1890). Justice Stevens
suggests that because the search in the instant case was directed toward photographs (i.e. "mere
evidence") it could not have withstood a test of constitutionality prior to Warden. 98 S. Ct. at
1987-88. Moreover, Warden effectively created a constitutional void. Since mere evidence was
exempt from seizure when the Fourth Amendment was drafted, the meaning of that Amend-
ment's warrant requirements (particularly probable cause) is undetermined with respect to this
post-Warden category of evidence. Id.
It is quite plausible to suggest that the Fourth Amendment was purposely written in general
terms to allow for such contingencies as the mere evidence rule (or its abandonment). On
numerous occasions the Court has explained that the ultimate standard under the Fourth
Amendment is "reasonableness," and that such a word admits of great flexibility. See, e.g.,
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 539 (1967).
Justice Stevens also criticizes the Court fr not comprehending the novelty of the question
presented by the instant case. "Today, for the first time, the Court has an opportunity to
consider the kind of showing that is necessary to justify the vastly expanded 'degree of intrusion'
upon privacy that is authorized by the opinion in Warden v. Hayden.- 98 S. Ct. at 1978. He
concludes that in searches for mere evidence, unless there is "probable cause to believe that the
custodian is a criminal," or "if' notice were given, he would conceal or destroy the object of the
search," the search would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's right to privacy and,
therefore, a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1990-91.
57. The Court even acknowledged this "concession" by petitioners. 98 S. Ct. at 1979.
58. 98 S. Ct. at 1989-90. Although Justices Stewart and Marshall dissented solely on First
Amendment grounds, they also admitted that the possession of certain items (e.g. contraband)
would be sufficient to justily even a newsroom search.
59. This would effectively place law enforcement officials in the same situation they were in
before the district court's decision, since, except where a search was for mere evidence (which
is rare, see DETECTION OF CRIME, supra note 55, at 101) there could be no subpoena re-
quirement. A careful reading of respondents' briefi indicates that law enforcement officials'
primary fear was that the district court's ruling would alter the present warrant procedure in all
cases. "Additional information would be required for every search warrant application.- Brief
for Petitioners Bergna and Brown at 17 (emphasis in original). This fear would obviously be
unjustified if the district court's subpoena rule applied only to searches for mere evidence be-
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poena would be required,6" it is difficult to subscribe to the majority's con-
clusion that law enforcement efforts would be seriously frustrated by the
lower court's holding, even if the privilege against self-incrimination was
consistently asserted. Moreover, it is not enough to say that an individual's
interest in privacy is secure in the hands of a clear-thinking prosecutor. 61
For even though the Court is correct in believing that a search warrant is
more difficult to obtain than a subpoena, the difficulty is not so great as to
deter even a "rational" prosecutor from attempting to procure the former. 62
At any rate, because the majority failed to comprehend the limited
number of cases in which the district court's rule would be operative, they
have left unanswered the question of whether a third party's interest in pri-
vacy is sufficient to overcome the government's interest in effective law en-
forcement when a search is directed toward documentary evidence. 63 Ac-
cordingly, their analysis is both incomplete and unpersuasive.
Third Party Newsroom Searches: First Amendment Considerations
Despite their finding that a prohibition against third party searches in
general could not be countenanced nder the Fourth Amendment, the
majority then considered whether the First Amendment nevertheless forbids
searches of third party newsroons. 64 The Court began by noting the poten-
tial "chilling effects" upon the tInctioning of the media which respondents
and their supporting amici asserted would result from allowing newsroom
cause the issuance of a warrant always requires prosecutors to specifically designate the evi-
dence for which they are searching. See FED.R. CRIM. P. 41. Only searches for mere evidence
would require "additional information."
60. Of course, if there was any doubt as to how the district court's decision would be inter-
preted by magistrates, the Court could always have modified the lower court's decision by
explaining that it applied only to mere evidence.
61. In the past, the Court has been unwilling to find a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights
adequately protected during custodial interrogations by police officers or prosecuting attorneys
unless "Miranda warnings" have been given. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The
Court's holding in Miranda was premised on the fact that law entorcement officials (including
prosecutors, who are often present during interrogations) had uniformly employed techniques of
persuasion as well as deception in an attempt to elicit confessions. Id. at 455. Considering the
ominous implications of this observation, it is somewhat surprising that the Zurcher majority
would have so much confidence in the conduct of a prosecuting attorney when an individual's
right to privacy is at stake.
62. Despite the fact that search warrants (unlike subpoenas) require a showing of probable
cause and can be issued only by a magistrate, they are nonetheless often issued perfunctorily.
See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 289 (1974). See also
W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY, 17-52 (Remington
ed. 1965); DETECTION OF CRIME, supra note 55, at 121-55; LaFave & Remington, Controlling
the Police: the Judge's Role in Making and Reviewing Law Enforcement Decisions, 63 MICH. L.
REV. 987, 991-95 (1965); LaFave, Improving Police Performance Through the Exclusionary
Rule-Part 1: Current Police and Local Court Practice, 30 Mo. L. REv. 391, 411-15 (1965).
63. The question is considered in the Alternative section of this Note.
64. 98 S. Ct. at 1980.
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searches. 65  First, timely publication may be impeded by physical disrup-
tions. In addition, confidential sources could dry up from fear of exposure
and possible prosecution. Similarly, reporters may be deterred from preserv-
ing their notes and recollections. Further, the dissemination of news may be
chilled by fears that "internal editorial deliberations" will be disclosed. Fi-
nally, self censorship may be initiated in order to conceal from police the
possession of' potentially desirable information .66
While conceding that "the struggle from which the Fourth Amendment
emerged 'is largely a history of conflict between the Crown and the
press,'" 67 the Court rejected these arguments in toto, citing both the lack of
data to support them 68 and its recent rejection of similar arguments in
Branzburg v. Hayes. 69  In Branzburg, the Court had held that the First
Amendment does not provide a testimonial privilege relieving a newspaper
reporter of his obligation as a citizen to respond to a grand jury subpoena
and answer questions relevant to a criminal investigation. 70  The Branzburg
decision, however, is distinguishable from Zurcher on several grounds.
First, the Court in Branzbtrg explicitly limited its analysis solely to a
determination of a reporter's right to withhold information from a grand
juV. 7 1 Writing for the majority, Justice White copiously documented the
65. Id. at 1980-81.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1981 qnoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 482 (1965).
68. Despite the Court's rejection of these arguments, there is substantial support for them.
See Comment, Search Warrants and Journalists' Confidential InJbrination, 25 AM. U. L. REV.
938 (1966); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege: Government Investigations, Criminal Prosecu-
tions and Private Litigation, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 1198 (1970); Comment, Search Warrants and
Journalists' Confidential Injormation, 4 J.L. REF. 85 (1970); Guest & Stanzler, The Constitu-
tional Argument Jor Newsmen Concealing Their Sources, 64 Nw. U. L. REV. 18 (1969); Com-
ment, Newsman's Privilege Two Years After Bransburg v. Hayes: The First Amendment in
Jeopardy, 49 TUL. L. REV. 417 (1975); Comment, The Newsman's Privilege after Branzburg:
The Case Jor a Federal Shield Law, 24 U.C.L.A. L. RE\'. 160 (1976). See also Affidavits of
Walter Cronkite, Gordon Meanning, Douglas Kneeland, et al., Petitioners Brief for Certiorari,
Joint Appendix at 57-147, Zurcher v. The Standard Daily, 98 S.Ct. 1970 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Joint Appendix].
In response to the second and lourth possible "chilling effect" it is interesting to consider that
if reporters did not preserve their notes and recollections and/or self'censorship were initiated,
the Court's decision could be self-deteating: there would be no news stories from which police
could determine the existence of evidence and/or that evidence would be destroyed after the
stories were printed.
69. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
70. For an interesting analysis of Branzburg and its impact, see Goodale, Branzbnrg v.
Hayes and The Developing Qualified Privilege for Newsmen, 26 HAST. L.J. 709 (1975).
71. 408 U.S. 665 at 682. Athough Justice White (lid mention that the holding would also
apply to criminal trials, id. at 690-91, this was obiter dictum. Note, too, Justice Powell's observa-
tion on "the limited nature of the Court's holding." Id. at 409 (Powell, J., concurring). At least
one lower court justice has suggested that Branzburg is "controlled" by Powell's opinion. See
United States v. Liddy, 478 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Leventhal, J., concurring). The holding
may be further limited by the fact that all three reporter-plaintifll had actually witnessed the
crime (as opposed to simply having knowledge or evidence of it, as was the claim made against
The Stanford Daily) and refused even to appear in front of the grand jury.
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grand jury's invaluable role in law enforcement and that institution's "his-
toric" and "essential" reliance on the subpoena process. 72  Zurcher, how-
ever, presents no issue even remotely affecting the grand jury's tunction.
And far from demanding an exemption from subpoenas, as had been re-
quested by the plaintiffs in Branzburg, The Stantord Daily was imploring the
Court to require them. 73
Second, the privilege from disclosure urged by the petitioner in
Branzburg conflicted with the well-established rule that "the public has a
right to every man's evidence." 74  Zurcher, on the other hand, involved
only a choice of means for obtaining information; no "privilege" to withhold
was asserted.
Third, and most important, Branzburg did not involve the possibility of
physical disruption of newsrooms or the potential exposure of internal edito-
rial deliberations. 75  The Zurcher Court minimized these concerns by exp-
laining that the proper administration of the preconditions for a warrant
would prevent needless rummaging through files. 76  But this argument is
72. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 at 686-90, 701 (1972).
73. Prior case law has in fact established a clear difference between subpoenas and search
warrants, particularly in regard to their instrusiveness and the degree of judicial supervision
which each requires. "A subpoena is served in the same manner as other legal process; it
involves no stigma whatever; if the time for appearance is inconvenient, this can generally be
altered; and it remains at all times under the control and supervision of a court." United States
v. Doe (Schwartz), 457 F.2d 895, 898 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, C.J.), quoted in United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 10 (1972). See also People v. Warburton, 7 Cal. App. 3d 825, 86 Cal.
Rptr. 894 (1970):
The flaw in defendant's thesis here is that it uncritically equates servicing a sub-
poena duces tecum with entering an office and forcibly seizing papers found there.
When police unjustifiably enter an office and seize papers, privacy is irrevocably
destroyed. But the issuance and service of a subpoena do not, by themselves, in-
vade the private papers of anyone.
Id. at 824.
74. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 at 688, quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323, 331 (1950); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2192 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). In
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974), the Court stated:
The duty to testily has long been recognized as a basic obligation that every citizen
owes his Government. Blackrner v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 438, 52 S. Ct. 252,
255,76 L. Ed. 375 (1932); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331,70 S. Ct. 724,
730, 94 L. Ed. 884 (1950) ...The duty to testify may on occasion be burdensome
and even embarrassing. It may cause injury to a witness' social and economic status.
Yet the duty to testify has been regarded as "so necessary to the administration of
justice" that the witness' personal interest in privacy must yield to the public's
overriding interest in full disclosure. Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. [273] at
281. ...
For an amusing illustration of the rule, see 4 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 320-21 (Edin-
burg ed. 1843).
75. The former "chilling effect" is obviously not possible in any case involving the service of
a subpoena. The latter, although possible (i.e., a reporter might be subpoenaed to testify as to a
conversation about editorial deliberations), is unlikely.
76. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
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entirely specious, for there is simply no conceivable way to search for a few
documents in a room filled with many, without doing precisely that.
77
Moreover, unlike searches for weapons or narcotics, newsroom searches for
photographs or writings actually require police to read and examine every
document until they have found either the ones specified in the warrant or
satisfied themselves that the evidence is not there.78  In contrast, a sub-
poena duces tecun is far less intrusive, as it involves neither an entry nor a
search or seizure. 7
9
The Court also rejected arguments that seizures of presumptively pro-
tected materials always require a prior adversary judicial hearing to examine
the state's entitlement to such material and to assess potential invasions of
First Amendment freedoms.8 0  The Court construed a series of former
cases 8l to require such a hearing only when the seizures involved a "prior
restraint"' 8 2 upon free expression. Because The Stanford Daily was not "re-
strained" from printing any news story or photograph, such cases were found
to be inapplicable. 83  This finding is not, however, entirely correct, for al-
though each of the cases cited involved a prior restraint, none of them
suggested that in the absence of such an intrusion no prior hearing was
mandated. In fact, each emphasized the duty of the Court to consider, in
deciding the constitutionality of a given search, such factors as the locus of
77. Id. at 1985 n.7 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, The Stanford Daily v. Zurcher, 353
F. Supp. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1972), quoting affidavit of CBS News Director Gordon Manning:
To allow this kind of free-wheeling search is to invite more searches, since a work-
ing newsroom contains an abundance of information, much of which would be ar-
gued by investigators to be useful ... Not only would these news gathering and
reporting functions be inhibited in an exaggerated but a similar way to which the
subpoena power inhibits, but also the very ability of the news organization to oper-
ate would be threatened. A search warrant presumes that material must be sifted
before the needed material is located. I can imagine the working of a newsroom
being brought to a complete halt while this voluminous and as yet unorganized
information is "searched."
78. This is, unfortunately, a necessary, albeit ironic, consequence of the Fourth Amend-
ment's specificity requirement.
79. See note 73 supra.
80. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
81. Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968); Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636 (1968); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas,
378 U.S. 205 (1964); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
82. Such "restraints" have traditionally been defined as "those barring information and ideas
from reaching the public," Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HAR. Cmv. RTS. L.
REV. 519, 519 (1977) See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
83. 98 S. Ct. at 1982. But see Justice Stewart's dissent: "The decisions of this Court estab-
lish that a prior adversary judicial hearing is generally required to assess in advance any
threatened invasion of First Amendment liberty. " 46 U.S.L.W. at 4553 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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the search and the type of evidence sought.8 4  The Court, however, never
undertook this kind of detailed inquiry.
The majority's third party newsroom analysis suffers from the same mis-
takes which plagued their discussion of third party searches in general,
namely, misapplied precedent and an inchoate examination of' the issue. For
had the Court followed the standard suggested by the "prior restraint"
cases 85 and other decisions involving a convergence of First and Fourth
Amendment rights,86 it would have balanced the petitioners interest in ef-
fective law enforcement against the respondent's interests in privacy and
freedom of the press. Although the Court did engage in a balancing analysis
of sorts,8 7 it was restricted to respondent's Fourth Amendment claim, and as
noted above, it was markedly inadequate.8 8  This analytical deficiency, to-
gether with the Court's injudicious reliance upon Branzburg, fatally flawed
its opinion.8 9
84. It has been noted that "[a] seizure reasonable as to one type of material in one setting
may be unreasonable in a different setting or with respect to a different kind of material."
Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 501 (1973). See also note 81 supra.
85. See notes 81 & 84, supra.
86. In United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) the Court considered
the constitutionality of a particular type of domestic security surveillance. In phrasing the issue,
the majority said "as the Fourth Amendment is not absolute in its terms, our task is to examine
and balance the basic values at stake in this case: the duty of Government to protect the
domestic security, and the potential danger posed by unreasonable surveillance to individual
privacy and free expression." Id. at 314-15. The majority also observed that cases which "reflect
a convergence of First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of 'ordinary' crime
. . . involve greater jeopardy to constitutionally protected speech." Id. at 313. Although the
United States Court therefore believed that "balancing" represents a rigorous level of scrutiny,
the more liberal members of the Court consistently assert that such a standard allows the
judiciary to unjustifiably circumvent the clear commands of the Bill of Rights. See Schneckloth,
Conservation Center Superintendent v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) ("the Framers of the
Fourth Amendment struck the balance . . ."). Id. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Linkletter v.
Walker, Warden, 381 U.S. 618 (1965) (Court viewed as following "a recent pattern of balancing
away the Bill of Rights guarantees . . ."). Id. at 645 (Black, J., dissenting). See also note 90
infra. If one adopts the perspective of these dissenting Justices, the Zurcher majority may be
criticized for failing to employ even a minimal level of scrutiny. From the point of view of the
United States Court, the majority simply fiiled to use the proper level.
For examples of cases which employ the balancing technique where only Fourth Amendment
interests are at stake, see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (the determination of whether a warrant should be issued for
an area search involves a balancing of the legitimate interests of law enforcement with protected
Fourth Amendment rights) Id. at 284 (Powell, J., concurring).
87. See 98 S. Ct. at 1979.
88. See notes 49-63 and accompanying text supra.
89. The closest the Court came to articulating a First Amendment standard was to explain
that "where the materials sought to be seized may be protected by the First Amendment, the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment must be applied with 'scnpulous exactitude.' 98 S. Ct.
at 1981, quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). The Court apparently took this to
mean that the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirements must be applied scrupulously, and
thus concluded that since the warrant in the instant case technically adhered to the require-
ments set forth in that Amendment's second clause, the search was constitutional. But the first
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AN ALTERNATIVE ANALYSIS
Although a balancing approach has been criticized by several members of
the Court when employed in a First Amendment context, 90 it has been uni-
formly adhered to in cases involving either the Fourth Amendment alone or
the First and Fourth Amendments conjointly.91 Moreover, the somewhat
speculative, yet consequential nature of the harms attending newsroom
searches, makes this analysis singularly appropriate. For it allows considera-
tion of both the likelihood and potential intensity of newsroom searches to
be weighed against the possible damage to law enforcement efforts resulting
from the prohibition of such intrusions.
The following observations seem to fairly characterize a balancing of these
competing interests. First, the Supreme Court has consistently held that
privacy is one of the foremost rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 92  Ac-
cordingly, they have held that the permissible scope of any search may not
exceed that which is reasonably necessary to discover the desired evi-
clause of the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of any kind, with
or without a warrant, and case law has clearly held there is "no ready test for determining
reasonableness," other than requiring a "balancing [of] the need to search against the invasion
which the search entails." Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967). See also
Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931): "There is no formula for the determination
of [Fourth Amendment] reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and cir-
cumstances." Id. at 357.
90. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972), wherein dissenting Justice Douglas
stated: "[In regard to the First Amendment] my belief is that all of the 'balancing' was done by
those who wrote The Bill of Rights." See also Konisberg v. State Bar of Calif., 366 U.S. 36, 61
(1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 143 (1959); Black, The Bill of Rights, 35
N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 879 (1960).
91. See notes 86 & 89 supra.
92. In his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928), Justice Bran-
deis explained the primacy of this right:
The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the government, the right
to be let alone-the most comprehensive of all rights and the right most valued by
civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478. Justice Bradley, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) described the right
which the Fourth and Fifth Amendments protect in this way: "It is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private property.
. . . Id. at 630. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), which declared that the exclusionary
rule is not mandated by the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a major-
ity of the Court, said: "The security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society." Id. at 45.
In recent years, the Court has held that the right of privacy clearly extends to areas of
personal autonomy. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraceptives for unmarried persons); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (private possession of obscene material); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
(marital privacy).
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dence.9 3 But under this standard, documentary searches, unlike those for
weapons or plunder, would compel police to scrutinize all of one's papers,
personal or otherwise, until they have found those specified in the war-
rant. 94  The uniquely intrusive character of documentary searches, there-
tore, indicates the potential for invasions of privacy which such searches may
entail.
Second, searches of newsrooms include an additional and perhaps more
serious detriment-the infringement of First Amendment press rights.
95
Such searches certainly involve potentially greater chilling effects than the
petitioners in Branzburg had urged against subpoenas.9 6 Considering the
somewhat solicitous treatment which the majority in Branzburg gave to such
contentions,9 7 it is astonishing to observe the cavalier manner 9 8 in which the
Zurcher Court dismissed more persuasive arguments.99 For newsroom
searches may cause not only a drying up of confidential sources, 100 but also
93. See Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 264 (1974):
"The police may look only where the items described in the warrant might be concealed."
(emphasis supplied).
94. See note 78 supra.
95. See notes 65-66, and accompanying text supra. Note also the various "shield" laws
enacted in 26 states to protect newsmen. See, e.g., CAL. EviD. CODE § 1070 (West Supp.
1978); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 111-19 (1977 & Supp. 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-21,
29 (West Supp. 1978). For an analysis of many of these statutes, see Hearings on H.R. 717
Before Subcomm. No. 3 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 301 (1973).
96. See notes 73-79, and accompanying text supra. See also Note, Search and Seizure of the
Media: A Statutory, Fourth Amendment and First Amendment Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 957,
989, 994 for an excellent argument that search warrants are far more dangerous to press rights
and privacy freedoms than subpoenas.
97. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690, 693, 707 (1972). The Branzburg Court
clearly conceded that petitioners' claims were not insignificant. They believed, however, that
certain factors outweighed these claims. See notes 63, 65 and accompanying text supra.
98. 98 S. Ct. at 1981-82.
99. See notes 70-77 supra.
100. See note 66 and accompanying text supra. For cases which recognize the media's re-
liance on confidential information, see also Farr v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467-68 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied 427 U.S. 912 (1976); Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dis-
missed, 417 U.S. 938 (1974), Baker v. F&F Inv. 470 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 966 (1973); Morgan v. State, 337 So. 2d 951 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1976); Rosato v. Superior
Court, 51 Cal. App. 3d 190, 124 Cal. Rptr. 427 (1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976);
affidavit of Gene Roberts, Joint Appendix, supra note 68 at 124-30, Affidavit of Douglas Knee-
land, Joint Appendix, supra note 68, at 66-71. "If the government is permitted to search news-
paper offices or even the homes of newsmen for unpublished photographs, notes, tape record-
ings or other materials, [that trust which prompts] sources to disclose information will be effec-
tively destroyed." Id. at 68. The Roberts' affidavit stated:
It will not matter that the newspaper of the individual newsman is an unwilling
accomplice of the government. An accomplice he will be, his hardwon reputation
for independence shattered. Doors will be closed. And the public will be deprived
of much that it has the need and the right to know.
Id. at 128.
1978]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
prolonged physical disruptions 101 as well as the exposure of' internal editorial
deliberations. 1 0 2
Third, where by the nature of the evidence sought 1 0 3 or for some inde-
pendent reason the police suspect that the possessor of' property i's criminally
involved, the issuance of' a subpoena is clearly an inefficacious way of procur-
ing the desired property.10 4  However, an unsuspected person in possession
of documentary evidence could well be a bona fide third party who would
honor a subpoena or even an informal request.l0 5
Finally, when one considers the statistically insignificant role which search
warrants play in criminal investigations, 10 6 the kind of evidence generally
secured through warrants, 10 7 the paucity of' media searches, 10 8 and the vari-
ety of' methods available to the police for obtaining evidence, 10 9 the govern-
101. See notes 66, 75-79 and accompanying text supra. According to the Los Angeles Times,
in 1974 the L.A. police searched radio station KPFK-FM for more than eight hours in an
unsuccessful attempt to obtain the original copy of a message from a terrorist group which
claimed credit for committing two bombings. Los Angeles Times, Oct. 11, 1974, at 4 col. 1. See
also affidavit of Frank Haven, Joint Appendix at 60-66, "the thorough disruption of day-to-day
newspaper operations which would result from subjecting newspapers to the use of search war-
rant procedures is too obvious to require much elaboration." Id. at 63.
102. See notes 66, 75 and accompanying text supra.
103. E.g., weapons and contraband.
104. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) wherein it was noted: "The danger is all too
obvious that a criminal will destroy or hide evidence or fruits of his crime if given any prior
notice." Id. at 93-94 n. 30.
105. The Court's failure to examine the law enforcement interest in relation to the specific
facts of the Zurcher case obscured a legitimate law enforcement argument. Since previous ex-
perience has shown that media personnel often risk contempt citations and incarceration rather
than respond to a subpoena requiring testimony, would they not similarly destroy documentary
evidence in their possession upon receipt of a subpoena duces tecum. See note 88 and accom-
panying text supra. See also Guest & Stanzler, note 68 supra and Murasky, The Journalist's
Privilege: Branzburg and Its Aftermath, 52 TEX. L. REV. 829, 858 n.94 (1974). According to
Ms. Murasky, one study indicates that in 96% of all cases noted, newsmen have chosen to
accept contempt citations when grand juries insisted on their testimony.
Despite this argument's strong prima facie appeal, there is a very pragmatic consideration
militating against such actions on the part of the media. Should the practice of destroying evi-
dence become sufficiently widespread to seriously burden law enforcement efforts, magistrates
naturally would tend to accept prosecutorial claims regarding the impracticability of issuing
subpoenas. Therefore, newsmen's contemptuous disregard of subpoenas would serve only to
undermine their own best interests by increasing the chances that future evidence would be
secured through searches.
Besides, if the Court has enough faith in magistrates to believe that they will handle the
issuance of search warrants prudently, it is only logical to expect that, if the district court's rule
were affirmed, magistrates would be equally as prudent in the issuance of subpoenas. See 98 S.
Ct. at 1982.
106. See DETECTION OF CRIME, supra note 55, at 100-101, 105.
107. Id.
108. See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 12 PRESS CENSORSHIP NEWS-
LETTER (1978) [hereinafter PCN] The PCN claims that only ten such searches have ever been
carried out. See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae note 109 infra.
109. See DETECTION OF CRIME, supra note 55, at 3-4; E. ELDEFONSO, A. COFFEY & J.
SULLIVAN, POLICE AND THE CRIMINAL LAw 62 (1972); Amsterdam, supra note 12, at 358-60.
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ment's interest in law enforcement would have suffered no substantial loss
had the Court prohibited merely newsroom searches for documentary evi-
dence. 110
The foregoing analysis has indicated the kinds of harms and gains which
may result from forbidding searches similar to the one carried out
against The Stanford Daily. While the benefits of such searches to crimi-
nal investigations are virtually de minimis, 111 the detriments to First 112 and
Fourth Amendment freedoms are quite substantial. The balance of interests
should have tipped against permitting these potentially dangerous and, until
recently, 113 unheard of intrusions.114
CONCLUSION
It is diflicult to assess what consequences will follow from the Supreme
Court's decision in Zurcher. The Court suggests that the scarcity of media
searches provides a secure foundation for believing that the final adjudication
of the Zurcher controversy in favor of the petitioners will be an unlikely
See also Amicus Brief of National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers which states "histor-
ically police and prosecutors have always either requested [documentary evidence] informally or
had a grand jury or court issue a subpoena duces tecum ..." and Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae at 3 which argued: "[There is a] strong [federal] preference for subpoenas or
informal requests where feasible .. . [Federal] law enforcement officials rarely, if ever, engage
in the practice of searching newspaper offices. No case has been found in which any media
facility has been searched under federal auspices."
110. In fact, in the Brief for the United States at 32, as Amicus Curiae it was said the
"federal law enforcement efforts would not be seriously hampered by a decision of [the
Supreme Court] approving the 'subpoena first' rule of the courts below in the limited context of
searches of the press as a neutral third party believed to be in possession of evidence bearing
upon a criminal investigation." Respondents had, of course, never contended anymore than this.
In response to the argument that such a prohibition would constitute a resurrection of the
now discarded mere evidence rule, see Reply Brief for Petitioners Bergna and Brown, Zurcher
v. The Stanford Daily, at 3 n.3, it should be observed that the instant case involves only
documentary evidence. See also note 56 supra. Furthermore, the Court, on occasion, has re-
vived the distinction between the two kinds of evidence. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971), wherein the Court explained that inadvertency is necessary to justify seizures
under the "plain-view" rule, unless, perhaps, the desired items are "contraband [or] stolen [or]
dangerous in themselves." See also Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973) at 502.
111. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
112. Should the importance of First Amendment freedoms ever be questioned, one need
only refer to the admonishing words of Chief Justice Hughes:
[I]mperative is the need to preserve inviolate the constitutional rights of free
speech, free press and free assembly in order to maintain the opportunity for free
political discussion, to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes, if desired, may be obtained by peaceful means. Therein
lies the security of the Republic, the very foundation of constitutional government.
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937).
113. It was conceded by all parties that the Daily search was the country's first newsroom
search.
114. In Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), Chief Justice Bradley said, "Illegitimate
and unconstitutional practices get their first footing ...by silent approaches and slight devia-
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source of future First and Fourth Amendment abuses. 115 Yet the apparent
absence of' such searches before The Stanford Daily incident was probably
attributable to a feeling on the part of law enforcement officials that searches
of newspaper offices would receive judicial condemnation. 116  The Court's
holding, however, effectively puts an end to any such doubts and it certainly
opens the door to potentially serious invasions of privacy rights and press
freedoms. One may find solace, though, in that the Court nevertheless rec-
ognized the largely empirical nature of the Zurcher controversy, and said if
indeed "grave abuses" were to follow from its decision, "there will be time
enough to deal with [them]."117
Richard Stuart Schiffrin
tions from legal modes of prQcedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that
constitutional protections for the security of person and property should be liberally construed."
Id. at 649.
115. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
116. This is really the only explanation which is compatible with 1) law enforcement argu-
ments about how important such searches are, and the tremendous burden which will attend
their prohibition (see notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra) and 2) the absence of news-
room searches during the first 196 years of this nation's history (see note 113 supra.)
117. 98 S. Ct. at 1982.
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